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Abstract 
There is a growing recognition that for developed economies, like the UK, tariff-free market access is just one 
of a number of measures that ease cross-border trade flows. Modern trade agreements go beyond tariff 
reductions by setting rules, such as market access and regulation of foreign service providers. We examine the 
contribution of deep non-tariff provisions on international trade in goods and services. Using a gravity model, 
we find that provisions related to services, investment, and competition make up half of the overall impact of 
economic integration agreements on trade flows. These deep provisions have larger effects for trade in services 
than for trade in goods, and their relative contribution is highest in sectors that facilitate supply chain activity, 
such as transportation and storage. We apply our sectoral estimates of deep provisions to examine two 
counterfactuals of the UK signing bilateral deals with the US and with China and India. We find that negotiating 
services, investment, and competition provisions in these future deals would boost trade relatively more in 




Key words: trade agreements, integration agreements, EIAs, trade policy, provisions, non-tariff barriers  




This paper was produced as part of the Centre’s Trade Programme.  The Centre for Economic Performance 




This paper benefited from useful comments from Richard Baldwin, Julia Cajal, Céliene Carrère, Marcelo 
Olarreaga, Angelos Theodorakopoulos, Gregory Thwaites, and participants at the DEGIT XXII 
conference, ETSG 2017 conference, as well as internal presentations at the Bank of England and the 
OECD. 
 Swati Dhingra, London School of Economics, Centre for Economic Performance and CEPR. 
Rebecca Freeman, The Graduate Institute, Geneva. Eleonora Mavroeidi, analysis completed while at the 





Centre for Economic Performance 
London School of Economics and Political Science 
Houghton Street 




All rights reserved.  No part of this publication may be reproduced, stored in a retrieval system or 
transmitted in any form or by any means without the prior permission in writing of the publisher nor be 





Requests for permission to reproduce any article or part of the Working Paper should be sent to the editor 






 S. Dhingra, R. Freeman and E. Mavroeidi, submitted 2018. 
1 Introduction
On June 23, 2016, the United Kingdom voted to leave the European Union and pursue new trading
arrangements with the EU and the rest of the world. The EU is the UK’s largest trade and investment
partner. About half of the UK’s cross-border flows of goods and services are with the EU, and
membership determines provisions related to a vast number of policies and regulations that relate to
these areas. Much of the discussion of future trading arrangements has focused on whether the UK
should continue to have tariff-free trade with the EU, say, by staying in the European Free Trade Area
or the EU’s customs union.1 There is growing recognition, however, that for developed economies,
like the UK, tariff-free market access is just one of a number of provisions that are needed to ease
cross-border trade. Modern trade agreements go beyond tariff reductions by setting rules such as
market access and regulation of foreign service providers and promoting competition among domestic
and foreign businesses.
This paper examines the extent to which deep provisions in trade agreements that go beyond
reducing tariffs on goods ease the cross-border flows of goods and services. Looking at the distinct
provisions that are contained in modern economic integration agreements, we determine the contri-
bution of deep provisions in expanding trade in goods and services across different sectors of the UK
economy. In the context of design and impacts of trade agreements, moving from aggregate to disag-
gregate trade flows is an important exercise for determining which sectors are most affected by various
provisions. Using the granular estimates, we predict the sectoral impacts of including deep provisions
in future trading arrangements with the UK’s major trade partners.
A number of studies have examined the potential consequences of Brexit for the UK economy.
Most studies, for example Dhingra et al. (2017), HM Treasury (2016) and Kierzenkowski et al. (2016),
find that Brexit would have a negative impact on UK GDP, with estimates ranging from a 1.3%
loss under a soft Brexit with largely unchanged levels of market access with the EU, to a 3% loss
under a hard Brexit that has no new trading arrangements in place beyond the UK’s membership
in the World Trade Organization. These studies predict the potential impact of higher trade costs
on trade flows and welfare, but they do not estimate which policies covered in economic integration
agreements reduce trade costs. For instance, Dhingra et al. (2017) determine non-tariff barriers based
on firm surveys of the ease of doing business across borders, so their estimates are likely to reflect the
combined contribution of all deep provisions embedded in the trade agreement. We instead focus on
determining which provisions contained in trade agreements are most effective in lowering non-tariff
barriers to trade. Disentangling the relative contribution of deep provisions is relevant for the design
of a trade agreement. After Brexit, the UK will face a choice regarding which provisions to include in
its new arrangements, and a fundamental question is which of these are most important in reducing
the non-tariff barriers to trade.
Economic integration agreements (EIAs)—perhaps the most widely used tool through which poli-
1UK Trade Options Beyond 2019, House of Commons International Trade Committee, page 4.
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cymakers aim to foster strong trading relationships—have evolved greatly both in volume and scope
since their introduction in the 1990s. Roughly 300 EIAs are in force today, compared to only about 20
in 1990. And these new EIAs contain a range of new policy provisions which go beyond the scope of
traditional trade policy tools (like tariffs and quotas). Whereas the predominant focus of early trade
arrangements was lowering tariffs and quantitative restrictions to ease trade in goods, today’s EIAs
include a range of non-tariff measures, or provisions, to ease bilateral flows of services and investments
through reductions in barriers to cross-border market access and behind-the-border transaction costs.
Such provisions typically encompass measures such as mutual recognition of professional qualifica-
tions for service providers and investment liberalization and protection commitments, which often go
beyond the narrow remit of trade policy tools. EIAs which include these provision types are often
referred to as deep trade agreements, and these agreements have become more prevalent over time.
As such, Baldwin (2013) describes 21st century trade as more complex and interconnected, led by the
nexus of trade, services, investment, and measures to protect competition. In light of this, we focus
our analysis specifically on services, investment, and competition provisions and examine the extent
to which these non-tariff provisions in EIAs ease bilateral trade.
Despite a growing literature which has examined the impact of EIAs on trade flows, there is
limited empirical work studying which EIA provisions contribute most to expansion in bilateral trade.
Understanding the additional boost to trade from deep provisions is particularly important in the
current political economy, where major trading economies are seeking to re-negotiate existing EIAs or
to negotiate new trade accords with both regional and extra-regional trade partners. For instance, the
EU recently implemented the trade chapter (which includes tariff cuts on goods) of the Canada-EU
EIA, but revised its deeper commitments on investments amid public concerns.2 Deep provisions
are likely to be just as crucial in the Brexit negotiations. As tariffs between developed countries are
already low in many industries, most studies estimate that overall reductions in the UK’s bilateral
trade flows with the EU would be largely driven by higher non-tariff barriers after Brexit. Making up
for these reductions in trade with the EU through deals outside the EU would also require addressing
non-tariff barriers. Major trade partners, like the US, China and India, have even higher bilateral
non-tariff barriers with the UK. We therefore determine the impact of including deep provisions in
future deals with these trade partners.
At the aggregate level, we find that provisions related to services, investment, and competition
determine close to 60% of the estimated overall impact of trade agreements on exports (goods and
services combined). As production networks have become fragmented and dispersed, we examine both
gross trade and value added trade of intermediate and final goods and services separately. Gross trade
statistics need not represent the true value of countries’ exports in the presence of global value chains,
so we estimate the impacts for both the domestic and foreign content of any given sector. We find
that trade agreements with deep provisions have the largest impact on domestic value added, and
that services, investment, and competition provisions contribute roughly 50% to the overall impact of
2Investment in TTIP and Beyond - The Path for Reform, European Commission, page 3.
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EIAs on trade in services, and between 30% and 35% on trade in goods. These results hold regardless
of whether the goods or services are intermediates or final. As such, our analysis sheds light on
which provisions are most effective in increasing export volumes or tapping into production networks
through forward and backward linkages with trade partners. The findings are robust to the inclusion
of additional provision categories, which, alongside services, investment, and competition provisions,
encompass the universe of underlying clauses that make up deep agreements.
Unsurprisingly, the contribution of these provisions is statistically larger for trade in services than
for trade in goods. Their contribution to the “total effect” of a deep agreement outweighs the pure
“EIA effect” for trade in services, whereas the reverse is true for trade in goods.3 Nonetheless, since the
effect of services, investment, and competition provisions on trade in goods is about 30% of the overall
effect, our results support recent empirical firm-level evidence on the servitization of manufacturing
firms’ exports
At a more granular level, we find that the impact of provisions related to services, investment,
and competition on both gross and value added trade is statistically significant for the large majority
of sectors, and thus positively contributes to the total effect of deep agreements on trade flows.
However, we observe sectoral heterogeneity in terms of which effect—the EIA effect or the deep
services, investment and competition effect—dominates. Interestingly, the services, investment and
competition effect outweighs the EIA effect for trade in services sectors that facilitate the timely
delivery of goods. Among others, these include accommodation and food service activities as well as
transportation and storage. The latter encompasses land, water, and air transport industries, as well
as warehousing and support activities for transportation and postal and courier activities. As such,
our sectoral results hint that the inclusion of these provisions in trade agreements is a key element for
integration into partner countries’ production networks. Finally, we note that while the liberalization
of these non-tariff measures is particularly important for financial services and insurance activities,
the EIA effect alone is not.
Having decomposed the impact of EIAs into shallow and deep provisions, we use the results of
our sectoral regressions to determine how the composition of the UK’s bilateral exports to select
trade partners might differ after entering into a deep EIA with provisions on services, investment, and
competition. We examine two hypothetical EIAs: a bilateral deal with the US; and bilateral deals with
China and India. These countries are among the UK’s largest non-EU trading partners (and received
its largest share of non-EU exports in 2014). In both cases, we find that in a post-agreement scenario,
services exports increase on the whole relative to manufacturing exports and that sectoral domestic
value added trade increases more than gross or foreign value added flows. We also find that the
services sector that gains in particular is professional, scientific, and technical activities. Among other
industries, this sector covers scientific research and development and marketing research. As such,
3Here, the total effect refers to the combined effect of having a trade agreement that includes services, investment, and
competition provisions while the EIA effect is that attributable to having an EIA in place (without the extra provisions).
The “services, investment and competition effect” refers to the effect of these specific provisions when there is an EIA
in place. See Section 4.
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our results suggest that deep trade agreements that encompass non-tariff liberalization of services,
investment, and competition can increase economic activity in industries that are key to a country’s
innovative activity and which foster engagement in high-value stages of supply chains.
We contribute to three strands of empirical literature related to trade agreements, trade in services,
and a growing body of studies on global value chains. With regards to the former, it is widely accepted
that EIAs have a positive impact on bilateral trade flows, with their trade-enhancing effects being
“phased in” over a period of 10 to 15 years (Baier and Bergstrand, 2007; for a survey of the literature
see Lima˜o, 2016). More recent studies have also accounted for trade agreement depth to identify the
heterogeneous effects of EIAs based on either the type of agreement in place, or the number of behind-
the-border provisions they include. In the first instance, Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and
Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance (2017) distinguish trade agreements based on six distinct categories,
where a one-way preferential agreement is considered the shallowest agreement type, and an economic
union the deepest. These studies show that, among other stylized facts, deeper agreements have a
larger impact on overall trade flows. On the other hand, a second set of studies define depth based
on counting the number of provisions covered in an agreement, regardless of its type (e.g. Mattoo
et al., 2017; Mulabdic et al., 2017; Orefice and Rocha, 2014).4 Measuring depth this way, Mattoo
et al. (2017) find that the deepest EIAs boost trade among member countries by up to 44% relative
to shallow agreements.
However, these methods do not disentangle the heterogeneous contribution of different non-tariff
measures on trade flows. In terms of the first method, defining depth based on the type of agreement
at hand ignores potential differences in the preferential nature of the same agreement category. For
example, NAFTA stipulates many more trade preferences on both goods and services than does
the Thailand-Peru FTA, although both are classified as free trade agreements. Second, measuring
agreement depth by counting the number of provisions included implicitly assigns an equal weight
to all provision categories. In reality, it is likely that some provisions have a stronger impact on
trade than others. For example, Kohl et al. (2016) provide suggestive evidence of the heterogeneity
of EIA provisions using a principal components approach for trade in goods. We instead estimate the
heterogeneous contribution of individual provisions to determine which provisions are most important
in expanding trade.
Our results also address a critical gap in the literature. Due to paucity of services data, the
majority of research on the impact of trade agreements looks only at trade in goods, leaving much to
be discovered about how EIAs affect trade in services. A notable exception is Mulabdic et al. (2017),
who examine the impact of trade agreement depth (based on the count measure method) on gross
and value added trade in services in a Brexit-specific context. We instead determine which services
sectors are most affected by which provisions. We conclude that services sectors that see the biggest
benefits from services, investment, and competition provisions are those that are most important for
4Specifically, Mattoo et al. (2017) and Mulabdic et al. (2017) calculate several depth measures normalized between 0
and 1, whereby 1 indicates the agreement with the highest number of provisions. They also make variants of this index
which distinguish between policy areas covered, and those that are legally enforceable or weakly legally enforceable.
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supply chain integration.
Lastly, we contribute to the rapidly growing body of literature that links global value chains
(GVCs) and trade agreements. Both theoretical and empirical literature has noted that EIAs help
countries integrate into their partners’ supply chains. As production networks stretch many borders,
each stage relies heavily on internationally sourced inputs, which may well embody value from a host
of third countries. Such dynamics create the need for comprehensive integration strategies to ensure
the smooth functioning of GVCs. From a theoretical standpoint, Antra`s and Staiger (2012) present a
formal model to this effect. Empirically, defining trade agreement depth either a` la Baier, Bergstrand,
and Feng (2014) or as a count index, Johnson and Noguera (2017) and Mulabdic et al. (2017) examine
the impact of trade agreements on value added trade flows using gravity specifications and panel
datasets, yielding somewhat mixed results.5,6 Looking at the GVC story from a different angle, Orefice
and Rocha (2014) and Mulabdic et al. (2017) also explore the distinction between intermediate and
final gross trade flows. Our analysis distinguishes itself from the literature by estimating how specific
trade agreement provisions complement the effect of EIAs on trade in goods and services. In addition
to examining aggregate flows, we also look at the heterogeneity in sectoral impacts.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 documents general trends in EIAs and
provisions over time. Section 3 gives our empirical specification which is moitvated by the gravity
equation literature and explains the data sources used in our analysis. Section 4 presents the results
at both the aggregate and sector level, along with extensions and robustness checks. Finally, Section
5 concludes.
2 Trends in economic integration agreements
To motivate our empirical analysis, we start with the basic trends in the volume and complexity
of EIAs since the 1990s, when they became an important policy tool for international integration.
About 280 new EIAs have entered into force in the last 26 years. We first look at the share of EIAs
with non-tariff provisions. In keeping with previous work, we document the number of provisions
included over time for three main categories of EIAs. These are partial scope agreements (PSAs),
free trade agreements (FTAs), and customs unions (CUs). These categories roughly align with the
EIA depth variables used by Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng (2014) and Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance
(2017). According to their definitions, a PSA would be the shallowest agreement type and a CU the
deepest.
Figure 1 provides two main facts. First, FTAs have become much more prevalent in recent years,
making up the majority of all agreement types (64%) in 2015. Second, in addition to their high share
relative to other agreement types, the number of new policy areas they include which stretch beyond
5Johnson and Noguera (2017) use the value added to export (VAX) ratio as a left hand variable in a gravity model
framework, while Mulabdic et al. (2017) use the value of either DVA or FVA.
6Osnago et al. (2015) also provide empirical evidence of a relationship between deep trade agreements and vertical
foreign direct investment, driven by EIA provisions that improve the contractibility of supplied inputs.
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the scope of pure tariff reduction has increased. FTAs encompass more non-tariff provision categories
on average than CUs—identified in the literature as the deepest agreement type. Indeed, 16% of all
FTAs covered three to four non-tariff provision categories in 2015, and close to one in five agreements
included the maximum number of non-tariff liberalizing measures. In contrast, zero CUs included
more than three to four provision categories.7
Figure 1: Non-tariff provisions share, 1990-2015
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DESTA.
Figure 2 looks at the prevalence of the provision categories for the most frequent type of EIAs,
FTAs. There has been a general increase in the use of all deep provisions in FTAs over time. Provisions
related to services, investment, and competition have become an increasingly popular feature of modern
trade agreements. In 2015, 38% of all FTAs included provisions related to services liberalization—three
times more than the share in 1990 and over two times more than in 2000. Similarly, 30% of FTAs
included an investment chapter in 2015 versus 5% in 1990. And 27% included competition provisions
in 2015, compared to 3% in 1990.
While extensive research has been carried out on the impact of having an EIA (or a “deep” EIA)
on trade, there is limited work on which provisions contribute the most to easing trade flows. This
is an important question for the design of trade agreements, and the next Section decomposes the
overall EIA effect on trade flows into the contribution of shallow versus deep provisions.
7To be sure, there are of course additional advantages to being in a customs union that are not included here, such
as potentially larger reductions in tariff rates than an FTA would award.
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Figure 2: Prevalence of provisions in FTAs, 1990-2015
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DESTA.
3 Empirical strategy and data sources
This Section starts with a theoretical motivation for the gravity equation which forms the basis
for our empirical specifications. We then discuss the data sources for the variables in the empirical
specifications
3.1 Micro-foundations of the gravity equation framework
Our empirical model is based on the gravity equation framework of Head and Mayer (2014). They
define general gravity in trade flows from origin country i to destination country j as the set of models
that yield a bilateral trade equation:
Xji = GSiMjφjiεji (1)
where G is a “gravitational constant,” Si represents “capabilities” of exporter i as a supplier to all
destinations, Mj captures all characteristics of destination market j that promote imports from all
sources and εji is an error term. Bilateral accessibility of importer j to exporter i is captured in
0 ≤ φji ≤ 1, which proxies for the impact of bilateral trade costs on bilateral trade flows.
Head and Mayer (2014) show that benchmark trade models yield gravity equations of the form in
Equation 1. For example, the Dixit-Stiglitz-Krugman model generates a gravity equation. It considers






defined over varieties indexed
by c from each country i. Each consumer has a unit of labor with wage rate w. Firms have constant
unit costs c and pay a fixed entry cost f to produce. In equilibrium, firms enter until there are zero
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profits to be made and all labor, L, is exhausted in production and entry of home firms. In this
setting, the country-specific terms Si and Mj depend on aggregate outcomes. Si = Niw
1−σ
i depends
on the wage rate and the number of firms from the exporting country and Mj =
∑
iXji/Φj depends













The term Φj is the accessibility-weighted sum of the exporter capabilities which denotes the degree
of competition in the importing market and Ωi is an expenditure-weighted average of relative access
which equals Φi under symmetric trade costs φji = φij and balanced trade. The country-specific
terms therefore map model specifics to aggregate variables and the direct impact of trade costs on
trade flows can be determined from the bilateral term φji.
Writing in logs, the gravity equation of bilateral trade flows is: lnXjit = lnG + lnSit + lnMjt +
lnφjit + εjit. As is standard, we assume that the impact of trade agreements can be specified as
lnφjit = β TAjit + γji where TAjit is equal to one when countries j and i have a trade agreement
in operation at time t. The use of country-pair fixed effects, γji, has been widely shown to be the
most effective method to account for endogeneity bias between trade agreements and trade flows as
they capture time-invariant reasons for signing trade agreements such as geographical distance and
common language among countries. To avoid making structural assumptions on the specific forms of
the country-specific terms Si and Mj , the gravity equation can be estimated with these country-specific
fixed effects as lnXjit = α + βTAjit + δit + ϕjt + γji + εjit where δit and ϕjt are exporter-time and
importer-time fixed effects that subsume the country-specific terms Sit and Mjt. These country-time
fixed effects control for time-varying factors that could influence trade (such as exchange rate shocks)
and they account for the multilateral resistance terms which have been theoretically shown (Anderson
and Van Wincoop, 2003) and empirically demonstrated to bias the effects of trade agreements on trade
if not controlled for (Baldwin and Taglioni, 2006). The coefficient of interest is β, which gives the
extent to which trade agreements raise bilateral trade flows, holding economy-wide outcomes fixed.
3.2 Empirical specification for gross and value added exports
We are interested in how deep provisions could raise bilateral trade flows beyond those from shallow
clauses that typically feature in trade agreements (such as tariff reductions and removal of technical
barriers to trade). We therefore estimate the following reduced-form equation:
lnXijt = α+ β1EIAijt + β2provisionijt + δit + ϕjt + γij + εijt (3)
where Xijt represents bilateral exports between origin country i and destination country j in time t.
We estimate Equation 3 for three categories of bilateral exports of goods and services: gross; domestic
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value added (DVA); and foreign value added (FVA). For each of these categories, we then further
disaggregate the type of bilateral exports into into intermediate versus final categories.
The TAijt variable is decomposed into shallow and deep components (provisionijt). EIAijt is 1
if countries i and j have either a partial scope agreement, free trade agreement, or customs union in
place at time t. provisionijt is a vector of binary variables (described below), each equal to 1 if a
specific provision category is present in the agreement at time t. Importantly, provisionijt is never
equal to 1 if EIAijt = 0. Various provisions can “switch” from 0 to 1 over time (e.g. for EU accession
countries after each EU enlargement). The main sources of variation thus come from the entry into
force of a new EIA and adding of provisions into pre-existing EIAs.
To better understand whether certain sectors are more sensitive than others to EIA provisions, we
re-estimate Equation 3 at the sectoral level:
lnXijst = α+ β1sEIAijt + β2sprovisionijt + δit + ϕjt + γij + σst + ψis + κjs + εijst (4)
where Xijst now represents bilateral total exports (goods or services; gross, DVA, or FVA) between
countries i and j in sector s and at time t. σst, ψis, and κjs are sector-time, exporter-sector, and
importer-sector fixed effects, respectively. They capture sector-wide shocks such as technological
change and time-invariant reasons for higher trade such as comparative advantage based on technology,
factor endowments, and Armington product differentiation.
In both Equation 3 and Equation 4, our main coefficient of interest is β2, which represents the
partial effect of switching on a particular provision category within an agreement. Then eβ1(s)+β2(s) −
eβ1(s) gives the direct impact of having deep provisions on bilateral trade flows. To isolate our results
from year to year variability and to account for the fact that EIA effects likely do not adjust in a single
year’s time, we adopt the common convention of avoiding estimating our specifications of interest using
annual data (e.g. Baier, Bergstrand, and Feng, 2014; Baier, Bergstrand, and Clance, 2017). Instead,
we pool our data over two-year intervals.8
3.3 Primary data sources
The dependent variable for Equations 3 and 4 is based on bilateral trade data for goods and services
from the 2016 release of the World Input-Output Database (WIOD), made available by the University
of Groningen and described in Timmer et al. (2015). The data cover years 2000-2014 and comprise
information for 43 countries and 56 industries (Appendix 4.1).9 We group these industries into 19
sectors (3 goods and 16 services), as per the International Standard Industrial Classification Revision
4 (ISIC Rev.4). Given that gross exports measure the total value of a good or service that country
i sends to country j either in the form of intermediates (to be used in subsequent production) or
8The literature cited typically uses panel data over four-year or five-year intervals. However, given the relatively short
time dimension of our dataset, we chose to include two-year intervals instead. Nonetheless, our results are robust to
larger time intervals (see Section 4.4 and Appendix 5.3).
9Specifically, the 2016 release of the WIOD includes data for 28 European countries and 15 other major economies.
See Appendix 4.1 for a list of countries and sectors included in the analysis.
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for final consumption, breaking down gross trade flows into intermediate versus final categories lends
some indication of whether a good or service is part of a larger production network.
However, it is well known by now that gross trade statistics mask the true value that origin country
i contributes to its exports by “double counting” the value of goods and services that potentially cross
international borders many times. Decomposing gross trade into its domestic and foreign value added
components allows this double counting term to be isolated, and makes it possible to determine the
export value which is sourced domestically (DVA), compared with that which is sourced from other
countries (FVA). A relatively high DVA content indicates that the home country contributed a large
share of the total export value of the good or service (be it intermediate or final). On the other hand,
a relatively high FVA content indicates that the home country contributed relatively little to the total
export value of the good or service.
We decompose the WIOD tables for each year into DVA, FVA, and pure double counting com-
ponents, following the methodology of Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) and Wang, Wei, and Zhu
(2013) (which we refer to as WWZ for brevity). In short, the methodology decomposes gross (sectoral)
bilateral exports into four main categories: domestic value added absorbed abroad; domestic value
added that returns home; foreign value added; and pure double-counted trade in intermediates. In line
with the distinction between intermediate and final categories in gross trade data, the decomposition
methodology proposed by WWZ allows for the distinction between flows of intermediate and final
goods and services for domestic and foreign value added.
Figure 3 presents this accounting framework diagrammatically. For our analysis, we focus on the
“domestic value added absorbed abroad” (DVA) and “foreign value added” (FVA) components for
intermediate and final exports, which we further categorize into services and goods based on the ISIC
Rev.4 sectoral breakdown. Data Appendix 4.3 discusses the WWZ decomposition methodology we
use in detail.10
Information on trade agreements and trade agreement provisions is drawn from the Design of Trade
Agreements (DESTA) database, made publicly available by the World Trade Institute, and described
in Du¨r et al. (2014). Beyond reporting the presence of an EIA for bilateral trading partners, this
database also houses detailed information on the content of trade agreements, spanning the period
1948-2016. The types of trade arrangements (both bilateral and multilateral) included in DESTA
are: partial scope agreements; free trade agreements; customs unions; and framework agreements.
We exclude framework agreements from our analysis, as this category is extremely shallow, does not
necessarily contain any specific information on provisions or tariff reductions, and makes up only 1.2%
of all agreements in force.
Particularly relevant for our analysis, DESTA classifies trade agreement provisions into six main
categories, each of which aims to capture whether there are substantive clauses or a whole chapter
related to areas that go beyond reductions in tariff barriers. These categories are constructed based on
10The aggregate we use for total DVA includes both DVA absorbed abroad and DVA returned home. As such, the
aggregates we use for final DVA and intermediates DVA do not sum to total DVA.
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Figure 3: Decomposition of Gross Bilateral Exports per WWZ
Source: Authors’ rendition based on Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2013).
information on the design features of various types of agreements and include: services; investment;
competition; public procurement; intellectual property; and standards.
In short, variables on services, procurement, intellectual property, and competition provisions refer
to the fact that significant mention of these areas appears elsewhere in the agreement than the general
aim outlined in the preamble. In the case of services in particular, DESTA reports whether a trade
agreement chapter on services contains mention of provisions that cover national treatment obligations
or schedules of commitments. In the case of investment provisions, DESTA categorizes whether the
agreement includes an investment chapter based on a bilateral investment treaty (see Appendix 4.2
for detailed definitions of each variable).
In terms of the provisions included in provisionijt, it is important to note that several categories
tend to be included simultaneously and are thus highly colinear with one another. More so than
other categories, this is particularly the case for provisions on services, investment, and competition.
Figure 4 shows the co-existence of these three provision categories as a share of agreements that have
a services provision, for all unique EIAs, and those specific to the countries in our bilateral trade
dataset. As can be seen, in the year 2014, 45% of all trade agreements that had a provision on services
liberalization also had a provision on competition and investment.
Given the bilateral nature of our dataset and limited country sample, the co-existence of these
provision categories is amplified. In particular, 65% of our country sample is in the EU trading bloc
in 2014 (our last year of trade data), and all EU members have the same agreement characteristics
amongst themselves, as well as the same provisions with non-EU partners. As such, 75% of country-
pairs in our sample that had an agreement with a services provision in 2014 also had a provision on
competition and investment (Figure 4).
The high correlation between services, investment and competition is shown in Table 1 below. To
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Figure 4: Co-existence of svs., inv., & com. provisions, 1995-2016
share of services provisions
Source: Authors’ calculations based on DESTA and WIOD.
Notes: This figure shows the co-existence of services, investment, and competition provisions in an EIA, as a share of all agreements that have a
services provision. The solid blue line refers to all unique trade agreements available in DESTA. The dashed blue line refers to the agreements
used in our analysis (i.e. the agreements for which we also have trade data) and takes into account the bilateral nature of our dataset.
overcome multicollinearity problems, we group services, investment, and competition provisions in our
empirical specifications. The RHS variable in our baseline specifications is provisionijt=svs& inv& comijt
which equals 1 if countries i and j have an agreement that contains provisions on services, investment,
and competition. To verify that our results are not driven by omitted variable bias from other provi-
sions, we include all provision categories in subsequent specifications for robustness. Alongside those
on services, investment, and competition, the additional provision categories are meant to encompass
the full set of non-tariff provisions that can be included in deep EIAs. These are: proijt; iprijt; and
stdijt, which are dummy variables equal to 1 if countries i and j have an agreement that contains con-
crete provisions on public procurement; intellectual property protection; and standards, respectively.
Table 1: Correlation Table: DESTA Provisions, 2000-2014
svs& inv& com proijt iprijt stdijt svsijt invijt comijt
svs& inv& com 1.000
proijt 0.183 1.000
iprijt -0.074 0.128 1.000
stdijt 0.651 0.480 0.247 1.000
svsijt 0.830 0.444 0.049 0.794 1.000
invijt 0.994 0.180 -0.067 0.655 0.828 1.000
comijt 0.872 0.318 -0.003 0.754 0.907 0.865 1.000
Notes: N = 14,153. Underlying data is the full sample on which the baseline Equation 3 is run.
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3.4 Secondary data sources
The main advantage of using the WIOD as a primary data source is that it provides detailed infor-
mation on trade flows of both goods and services at a detailed industry level. From this information, it
also allows for the decomposition of trade flows into value added components. To test the robustness
of our results, we use alternative sources for trade flows. Specifically, because input-output tables,
which are based on National Accounting principles, rely in part on imputed trade values, we test our
results for gross (goods) trade using the NBER-UN dataset, described in Feenstra et al. (2005).11
This dataset provides annual, 4-digit Standard Industrial Trade Classification (SITC) Rev. 2 data on
bilateral trade flows for a panel of 185 countries over the years 1962-2011. We conduct our robustness
check for the period 1994 onward, reflecting the entry into force of most modern trade agreements.
4 Results
We start with our baseline specification of the role played by services and investment liberalization
in increasing trade flows. First, we focus on these provisions’ overall impact on total gross and
value added trade, without making the distinction between goods and services. Second, we look at
their effect on gross and value added trade in goods versus services and show that their positive
effect is (unsurprisingly) statistically larger for trade in services than for trade in goods. Third,
we explore their effect at the sector level to provide insights about how these deep provisions can
help exporters’ integration into supply chains. Finally, our sector-level results are fed into a policy
application whereby we examine two hypothetical FTAs with the UK’s largest non-EU trading partners
(US and China/India) to determine how the UK’s bilateral exports to these countries might differ if
they were to enter into a deep FTA with provisions on services, investment and competition. For ease
of presentation, all results tables are shown in Appendix 1.
4.1 Aggregate results - gross and value added
We find that deep provisions on services, investment, and competition make up about 60% of the
overall estimated impact of trade agreements on total, intermediate and final exports, and that this
impact is highest for domestic value added (Tables A1, A2, and A3). From a policy standpoint, this
finding provides empirical backing to the notion that deep trade agreements that include non-tariff
provisions have a stronger effect on exports, given their ability to address behind-the-border trade
barriers that can hinder participation in supply networks. This is reflected in the overall impact of
these provisions categories being strongest for DVA exports.
We next address exports of goods and services, in turn. Our first important finding is that services,
investment, and competition provisions (herein svs& inv& com) have a positive and significant impact
on both goods and services exports. This result holds irrespective of the type of trade flow—gross,
11Based on underlying information from UN-COMTRADE, this dataset covers merchandise trade statistics only.
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DVA, or FVA; total, intermediate, or final (Tables A4, A6, and A8)—and is robust to including the
full set of provision measures (Tables A5, A7, and A9).
Second, an F-test on a pooled regression for goods and services shows that the effect of svs& inv& com
provisions is statistically larger for trade in services than trade in goods, regardless of whether the
type is total, intermediate, or final. Again, this holds for whether the trade flow is gross, DVA, or
FVA.12,13 Nonetheless, while the overall effect of svs& inv& com provisions is statistically smaller for
trade in goods, our results still suggest that services liberalization, easing of investment, and mea-
sures related to competition policy positively impact goods exports in a non-trivial way. This finding
supports empirical results that rely upon granular data to explore the “servitization of exports,” i.e.
the phenomenon whereby manufacturing firms bundle goods and services exports to achieve product
differentiation. This is documented at the aggregate level (Miroudot and Cadestin, 2017) and at the
micro level across manufacturing firms (Ariu et al., 2016; Kelle, 2013).14
Third, as was the case for our estimates with goods and services combined, we observe that the
overall impact of EIAs with svs& inv& com provisions is largest for DVA of exports of both goods and
services. The suggested lower impact on FVA exports can potentially be explained in two ways. First,
by construction, the decomposition of gross trade into its value added components does not capture
the origin of exported foreign goods and services. As a result, we are unable to trace where the FVA
component is sourced from in our analysis. Thus, the ij FVA flow potentially contains value from
other countries that participated in previous parts of the value chain. Second, it is expected that a
trade agreement—encompassing various deep provisions—between countries i and j would necessarily
boost the domestic value added content of exported goods and services. To support increased domestic
production, therefore, the FVA component of exports would naturally rise as well.
To further interpret these results, we next use coefficients from columns with total exports in
Tables A5, A7, and A9 to calculate the “total effect” of having a bilateral trade agreement with
svs& inv& com provisions on gross, DVA, and FVA exports, respectively. This is eβ1+β2 − 1. We
then examine the effect that is attributed to the EIA alone, and that which is attributed to services,
investment, and competition provisions specifically. Results are shown in Figure 5.
12Test results refer to pooled regression results for the specifications in Tables A5 (gross), A7 (DVA), and A9 (FVA).
For total gross exports: F1,23424 = 18.17, p = 0.000; for intermediate gross exports: F1,23424 = 11.07, p = 0.001; for
final gross exports: F1,23424 = 10.99, p = 0.001. For total DVA exports: F1,23424 = 16.26, p = 0.000; for intermediate
DVA exports: F1,23424 = 9.43, p = 0.002; for final DVA exports: F1,23424 = 9.13, p = 0.003. For total FVA exports:
F1,23424 = 14.61, p = 0.000; for intermediate FVA exports: F1,23424 = 10.24, p = 0.001; for final FVA exports: F1,23424 =
10.54, p = 0.001.
13While the magnitude of the effect on intermediate inputs is larger than that for final goods and services, the difference
between the two is not statistically significant.
14Specifically, Miroudot and Cadestin (2017) show through an empirical study using aggregate data from the OECD
Trade in Value Added (TiVA) database that services inputs, whether domestic or foreign, account for about 37% of
the value of manufacturing exports. Using detailed Belgian firm-level data, Ariu et al. (2016) demonstrate that the
performance of goods exports is strongest for firms that also export services.
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Figure 5: Relative impact of EIA and svs& inv& com on total exports
Source: Authors’ calculations.
Notes: This figure shows the total, EIA, and svs& inv& com effects for total gross, DVA, and FVA exports, calculated from
coefficients in Tables A5, A7, and A9. 95% confidence intervals are shown for our effect of interest. All svs& inv& com effects
and EIA effects are significant at at least the 1% and 5% significance levels, respectively.
A couple of points stand out. In line with the above, we see that the total effect of an EIA
that includes provisions on services, investment, and competition is largest for services DVA exports
(74.02%), followed by gross services exports (70.92%) and FVA services exports (59.52%). This is at
least two times larger than the total effect of the same agreement type on DVA, gross, and FVA goods
exports (31.39%, 29.69%, and 30.87%, respectively). Moreover, for all types of services export flows,
the svs& inv& com effect outweighs the EIA effect, while the reverse is true for goods exports.15 This
shows that while tariff cuts are important for both goods and services flows, they are relatively (and
unsurprisingly) more important for goods exports. On the flip side, svs& inv& com are relatively
more important for trade in services.
4.2 Sectoral results - gross and value added
We next take a look at the impact of non-tariff provisions on services, investment, and competition
at a more granular level. While we find that svs& inv& com provisions are significant for the large
majority of cases, our sectoral results highlight substantial heterogeneity across services activities.
Figure 6 shows our results for gross exports, weighted by sectoral gross exports in the year 2014.16
Results for DVA and FVA exports are presented in Figures A1 and A2 in Appendix 2, respectively. As
in Figure 5, the gray bar represents the (now trade-weighted) total effect of an EIA that includes pro-
15The difference between the two is marginal, however, for services DVA.
16We weight our results using trade data from 2014 because this is the last year for which we have trade data.
Nonetheless, differences in results are trivial when using trade weights from different years or averages across years.
Results are presented pictorially for brevity, however, full regression output tables for each sector are available upon
request.
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visions on services, investment, and competition, and the blue diamonds represent the trade-weighted
svs& inv& com effect with 95% confidence interval bands. Unless shaded in gray, all svs& inv& com
effects are statistically significant at the 10% significant level or above.
This exercise highlights that sectors for which the svs& inv& com effect (with a relatively tight
95% confidence band) is greater than half of the total effect are those which are particularly important
for participation in supply networks. These include: accommodation and food service activities; and
transportation and storage. Especially in the case of the latter, the transportation and storage sector
facilitates the timely delivery of goods, which is crucial for cross-border flows of intermediate parts
and components used as inputs into to final products. Specific industries that make up the this sector
include land transport, air transport, courier activities, and warehousing and support activities for
transportation, all of which ease shipping and handling.
Furthermore, the svs& inv& com effect for transportation and storage (34% for gross and DVA
exports, and 45% for FVA exports) ranks either third (FVA) or fourth (gross and DVA) among all
sectors. This strengthens the above argument that not only are these deep provisions important for
trade in services (in addition to trade in goods), but that they have a particularly strong effect on
services sectors that are key to the smooth functioning of value chains through forward and backward
linkages.
One of the major sectors in the UK is financial services, which makes up over 7% of gross value
added (GVA).17 For total gross, DVA, and FVA exports, we also note that the svs& inv& com effect
is statistically significant at the 1% significance level for financial and insurance activities whereas the
EIA effect is not statistically significant. Moreover, the svs& inv& com effect for this sector ranks 7th
(out of 15) for all trade flows.
Our result on the financial and insurance activities sector is particularly interesting for services-
oriented economies, such as the United Kingdom. It highlights that, by design, svs& inv& com
provisions embedded in deep trade agreements have a specific role to play in boosting trade in industries
such as financial and monetary intermediation, or fund management—all which are included in this
sector. Such activities are not targeted or affected by traditional tariff preferences. Therefore, while
the standard use of a trade agreement to reduce tariff barriers might not be targeted at services which
cross borders electronically (and are thus not subject to customs controls, etc.), our results show that
deep provisions which liberalize investment policy, a range of services, and set rules on competition
have the potential to do just this.
17GVA share for 2016 from: The financial sector’s contribution to the UK economy, House of Commons.
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Figure 6: Trade-weighted impact of EIA and svs& inv& com
on gross exports
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the total and svs& inv& com effects for total gross exports, calculated
from coefficients from specification 4. 95% confidence intervals are shown for our parameter of interest, the svs& inv& com
effect. Unless shaded in gray, all svs& inv& com effects are significant at the 10% significance level or above.
4.3 Policy application: Trade effects of a hypothetical FTA
To put our analysis into context and demonstrate how our results relate to the negotiation of trade
agreements, we use the estimated effects from Equation 4 to back out how the composition of sectoral
exports might differ among trading partners after entering into an EIA with provisions on services,
investment, and competition. To do this, we consider a hypothetical deep FTA with these provisions
between the United Kingdom and the United States, and the United Kingdom and China/India.
These countries are among the UK’s largest non-EU trade partners and received the largest share
of its non-EU exports in 2014 (the last year for which we have trade data).18 In 2014, the UK sent
roughly 19% percent of its non-EU gross exports to the US, and 8% percent to China and India
combined. Relatedly, these countries are central to GVC activity and global trade networks.
For this application, we use data for the year 2014 and the estimated total, EIA, and svs& inv& com
effects calculated from our parameters of interest in Equation 4 (estimated with the full set of provi-
sion categories as shown in Tables A5, A7, and A9) which represent the average elasticity for a trade
agreement with our provisions of interest. With these granular estimates, we then analyze how signing
an EIA with these provisions might change the composition of sectoral exports for the countries in
question. The estimated sectoral impacts in levels and as a fraction of overall trade are shown in
Equations 5 and 6 below:
18To be sure, there are fifteen non-EU countries in our dataset and a rest of the world (ROW) aggregate. The UK’s













(eβˆ1s+βˆ2s − 1)∑Ss=1X0ijst (6)
where X0ijst represents sectoral (s) gross, DVA, or FVA exports from the United Kingdom to either
the US or China and India in year 2014 and X1ijst is the calculated sectoral trade flow after the average
effect of interest is applied. βˆ1s and βˆ2s are our estimates from Equation 4 for either gross, DVA, or
FVA exports.19
Figures 7, 8, and 9 present the results of this exercise for gross, DVA, and FVA exports from
the UK to the US, respectively. Figures A3, A4 and A5 in Appendix 3 present the corresponding
analysis for an FTA between the UK and China/India. In each figure, the “initial gross export share”
corresponds to the sectoral breakdown of bilateral UK exports in 2014 and the “post export share
(total effect)” refers to our estimated sectoral breakdown of bilateral UK exports if there were to be
an average EIA between the UK and the partner countries in question. As the initial and post export
shares are normalized by total and estimated exports, respectively, it is important to keep in mind that
increases (decreases) in the post-agreement scenario represent a rise (fall) in a given sector’s expected
performance relative to other sectors.
In our counterfactual trade agreements, manufacturing exports account for the large majority of
sectoral exports, both initially and in the post scenario. Nonetheless, we see that the implementation
of an EIA with clauses on services, investment, and competition changes this sector’s weight relative
to other services sectors (from 47% to 37% in the case of UK-US gross exports and from 69% to 61%
in the case of UK-China/India gross exports). The overall ranking of services sectors also changes for
UK-US exports.
For both the counterfactual TAs, among the largest relative increase in gross services exports is in
the professional, scientific, and technical activities sector (12.43 percentage points for the UK-US and
3.21 percentage points for the UK-China/India, representing double the initial export shares). This
sector includes scientific research and development (R&D); architectural and engineering activities;
management consultancy activities; legal and accounting activities; and marketing research. This
suggests that deep trade agreements can benefit industries that feed into innovation and knowledge
transfer (e.g. through R&D and other activities that are of high value creation in GVCs).
This sector also shows larger relative increases in DVA exports (Figure 8 for UK-US and Figure
A4 for UK-China/India) and has the largest absolute difference between increases in gross and DVA
exports.20 Notably, in the UK-US case, relative total DVA exports in the professional, scientific,
19We only use βˆ coefficients that are statistically different from zero at a significance level of at least 10%.
20The net increase in DVA exports of the professional, scientific, and technical activities sector is 13.42 percentage
points in the case of the UK-US and 3.85 percentage points for the UK-China/India. The absolute difference between the
increases in DVA and gross trade shares for UK-US and UK-China/India is 0.99 percentage points and 0.64 percentage
points, respectively.
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and technical activities sector exceed manufacturing exports after the counterfactual trade agreement
scenario, ranking first among all fifteen sectors in question. Results for sectoral FVA exports follow
the same overall trends, but are smaller than for gross and DVA.
Figure 7: Estimated change in sectoral composition of gross
exports from the UK to the US
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the sectoral decomposition of gross exports between the UK and the
US both before and after the signature of a hypothetical EIA, per equation 6.
Figure 8: Estimated change in sectoral composition of DVA
exports from the UK to the US
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the sectoral decomposition of DVA exports between the UK and the
US both before and after the signature of a hypothetical EIA, per equation 6.
19
Figure 9: Estimated change in sectoral composition of FVA
exports from the UK to the US
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the sectoral decomposition of FVA exports between the UK and the
US both before and after the signature of a hypothetical EIA, per equation 6.
4.4 Robustness
We conduct three main robustness checks to confirm the consistency of our results across estimation
methods and datasets, as well as to test the external validity of our results by using a larger country
sample. First, to compare with the literature that examines the effect of EIAs on trade flows, we re-
estimate our gross and sectoral results using panel data over four-year intervals. As explained in Section
4, given the relatively short time dimension of our bilateral trade data, our basline specifications use
two-year intervals, giving a total of 8 years of trade data (spanning a time period of 15 years). Using
panel data over four-year intervals thus leaves us with four years of data (spanning a time period of
13 years). To use the latest trade data available, we include years 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. This
does not eliminate much variation in our variables of interest, as the first EU enlargement we capture
was in 2004. Results for this exercise are presented in Appendix 5.3 and corroborate those in Section
4.1.
Second, we estimate Equations 3 and 4 using the Poisson pseudo maximum-likelihood (PPML)
estimator, proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). This method is more robust to different patterns
of heteroskedasticity and measurement error, and allows for the inclusion of zeros in disaggregated
bilateral trade flows. As it concerns our analysis, the presence of zeros is not of large concern. Indeed,
at the aggregate level there are no zeros in our trade variables. At the ISIC Rev. 4 sectoral level, a
maximum of 10% of the bilateral gross, DVA, and FVA flows in our sample are zeros, depending on
the sector. Results for this exercise are presented in Appendix 5.2. In short, we find that the impact
of services, investment, and competition provisions is positive and significant for goods and services
for all bilateral trade flows (gross, DVA, and FVA).
Finally, we re-estimate Equations 3 and 4 for gross goods trade using the NBER-UN dataset
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described in Section 3.4. In order to verify the consistency of our results using this dataset, we first
restrict the country sample to that which is available in the 2016 release of the WIOD. Subsequently,
in order to provide external validity to our results for gross goods we allow for the full country sample
available in the NBER-UN dataset (185 countries). Overall, we confirm the positive impact of services,
investment, and competition provisions when using both two-year and four-year time intervals.
5 Conclusion
This paper examines the extent to which deep trade agreements that stretch beyond tariff reduction
ease the cross-border flows of goods and services. From a policy perspective, the question of which
provisions are most important from a trade-enhancing point of view is important in designing and
understanding the impacts of trade agreements. Disentangling the effect of specific non-tariff provisions
is particularly relevant in today’s political climate when there is political interest in negotiating new
trade agreements and renegotiating old ones, as in the UK’s decision to withdraw from the EU.
At the aggregate level, two main findings are notable. First, we show that provisions related to
services, investment, and competition contribute the most to the overall impact of trade agreements
on trade in goods and services, for both gross and value added trade. Second, while the impact of
these provisions categories is statistically significant for both goods and services, it is statistically
larger for trade in services than for trade in goods. These results indicate that deep EIAs that include
substantive provisions that stipulate the liberalization of trade in services, as well as other chapters on
investment and competition, play an important role for trade in services overall. To our knowledge,
this is the first analysis to explore this question. We also confirm that these non-tariff provisions also
give an extra boost to goods exports. This finding complements recent firm-level studies, which show
that goods exporters that also provide services internationally outperform those that do not.
We observe heterogeneity across sectors when unpacking the additional boost to trade that non-
tariff provisions on services, investment, and competition (svs& inv& com effect) provide when in-
cluded in a trade agreement. Interestingly, the svs& inv& com effect proves most important for
services sectors important for value-chain efficiency, including accommodation and food service ac-
tivities as well as transportation and storage. The latter encompasses land, water, and air transport
industries, as well as warehousing and support activities for transportation and postal and courier
activities. This suggests that the inclusion of these provisions in EIAs can help integrate into partner
countries’ supply chains.
Finally, we conduct counterfactual policy applications to determine the sectoral impact of the UK
negotiating deep trade agreements with the US and with China and India—the partners to which
the UK sent the largest share of its non-EU exports in 2014. In both cases, we find that trade in
services sectors increase the most relative to manufacturing exports and that this relative increase is
largest for domestic value added exports. In a post-agreement scenario, the professional, scientific, and
and technical activities sector sees particular gains. Given that this sector is comprised of scientific
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research and development and marketing research industries (among others), this result suggests that
trade agreements which include non-tariff provisions have the potential to stimulate activity in sectors
which are important for innovation and integration into supply chains. As the quality of services and
value chains data improve, future work could provide further granularity on the role of deep provisions
on specific services and investments.
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Appendix 1 Main Results - Aggregate
Appendix 1.1 Baseline: Goods and services combined
Table A1: Baseline: Gross exports, Goods & Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.119*** 0.143*** 0.092** 0.096** 0.121*** 0.074*
(0.040) (0.046) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.043)
svs& inv& com 0.160*** 0.149*** 0.127***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.028)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.979 0.974 0.978 0.979 0.974 0.978
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 for gross exports. Robust SEs in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
Table A2: Baseline: DVA exports, Goods & Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.121*** 0.115** 0.097* 0.097** 0.088* 0.079*
(0.040) (0.045) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.042)
svs& inv& com 0.168*** 0.185*** 0.130***
(0.025) (0.029) (0.027)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.980 0.976 0.979 0.980 0.976 0.979
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 for DVA exports. Robust SEs in
parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
Table A3: Baseline: FVA exports, Goods & Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.115*** 0.110** 0.088** 0.095** 0.091* 0.072
(0.041) (0.046) (0.045) (0.041) (0.047) (0.045)
svs& inv& com 0.139*** 0.132*** 0.111***
(0.026) (0.029) (0.029)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.978 0.974 0.975 0.978 0.974 0.975
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 for FVA exports. Robust SEs in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
25
Appendix 1.2 Baseline for gross exports: goods and services
Table A4: Baseline: Gross exports, svs& inv& com provisions
Gross Goods Gross Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.052 0.010 0.078* 0.187*** 0.206*** 0.127**
(0.041) (0.048) (0.046) (0.053) (0.057) (0.051)
svs& inv& com 0.098*** 0.104*** 0.075** 0.276*** 0.257*** 0.222***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.982 0.977 0.977 0.967 0.964 0.968
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3, with the log of gross exports as the
LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1%
levels.
Table A5: Baseline: Gross exports, all provisions
Gross Goods Gross Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.162** 0.115 0.147* 0.251*** 0.311*** 0.146*
(0.074) (0.086) (0.076) (0.083) (0.089) (0.079)
svs& inv& com 0.098*** 0.102*** 0.073** 0.285*** 0.263*** 0.225***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
proijt -0.051 -0.074 -0.060 0.023 -0.017 -0.029
(0.052) (0.060) (0.060) (0.067) (0.073) (0.065)
iprijt -0.009 0.040 0.010 -0.271*** -0.237*** -0.251***
(0.052) (0.060) (0.059) (0.063) (0.068) (0.064)
stdijt -0.122* -0.109 -0.063 -0.062 -0.102 0.022
(0.073) (0.086) (0.074) (0.077) (0.083) (0.073)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.982 0.977 0.977 0.967 0.964 0.969
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 but including the full set of EIA provisions,
with the log of gross exports as the LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
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Appendix 1.3 Baseline for DVA exports: goods and services
Table A6: Baseline: DVA exports, svs& inv& com provisions
DVA Goods DVA Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.046 -0.005 0.086* 0.190*** 0.186*** 0.129**
(0.041) (0.048) (0.046) (0.053) (0.056) (0.051)
svs& inv& com 0.105*** 0.129*** 0.082*** 0.272*** 0.262*** 0.216***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.983 0.978 0.978 0.967 0.965 0.969
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3, with the log of DVA exports as the LHV.
Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
Table A7: Baseline: DVA exports, all provisions
DVA Goods DVA Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.168** 0.115 0.170** 0.274*** 0.312*** 0.165**
(0.074) (0.086) (0.076) (0.083) (0.087) (0.079)
svs& inv& com 0.105*** 0.125*** 0.081*** 0.280*** 0.272*** 0.219***
(0.026) (0.031) (0.030) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
proijt -0.060 -0.112* -0.056 0.025 0.024 -0.032
(0.051) (0.059) (0.059) (0.066) (0.072) (0.065)
iprijt 0.005 0.035 0.013 -0.258*** -0.267*** -0.237***
(0.051) (0.058) (0.058) (0.061) (0.067) (0.063)
stdijt -0.135* -0.111 -0.086 -0.092 -0.147* -0.002
(0.073) (0.087) (0.074) (0.077) (0.081) (0.073)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.983 0.978 0.978 0.967 0.965 0.969
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 but including the full set of EIA provisions,
with the log of DVA exports as the LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
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Appendix 1.4 Baseline for FVA exports: goods and services
Table A8: Baseline: Foreign value added, goods and services
FVA Goods FVA Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.085** 0.014 0.072 0.160*** 0.174*** 0.108**
(0.042) (0.049) (0.047) (0.054) (0.058) (0.053)
svs& inv& com 0.088*** 0.094*** 0.060* 0.246*** 0.238*** 0.206***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.980 0.976 0.974 0.967 0.963 0.967
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3, with the log of FVA exports as the
LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1%
levels.
Table A9: Baseline: Foreign value added, goods and services
FVA Goods FVA Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.182** 0.126 0.120 0.211*** 0.266*** 0.128
(0.075) (0.089) (0.077) (0.081) (0.088) (0.080)
svs& inv& com 0.087*** 0.092*** 0.056* 0.256*** 0.246*** 0.209***
(0.027) (0.031) (0.031) (0.035) (0.037) (0.035)
proijt -0.074 -0.092 -0.077 0.050 0.022 -0.022
(0.055) (0.062) (0.063) (0.067) (0.073) (0.067)
iprijt -0.040 0.003 -0.012 -0.277*** -0.275*** -0.260***
(0.054) (0.061) (0.061) (0.064) (0.069) (0.065)
stdijt -0.089 -0.105 -0.026 -0.058 -0.099 0.018
(0.074) (0.090) (0.076) (0.073) (0.080) (0.073)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153 14,153
R-squared 0.980 0.976 0.974 0.967 0.963 0.967
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 but including the full set of EIA provisions,
with the log of FVA exports as the LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
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Appendix 2 Main Results - Sector
Figure A1: Trade-weighted impact of EIA and svs& inv& com
on total DVA
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the total and svs& inv& com effects for total DVA exports, calculated
from coefficients from specification 4. 95% confidence intervals are shown for our parameter of interest, the svs& inv& com
effect. Unless shaded in gray, all effects are significant at the 10% significance level or above.
Figure A2: Trade-weighted impact of EIA and svs& inv& com
on total FVA
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the total and svs& inv& com effects for total FVA exports, calculated
from coefficients from specification 4. 95% confidence intervals are shown for our parameter of interest, the svs& inv& com
effect. Unless shaded in gray, all effects are significant at the 10% significance level or above.
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Appendix 3 Main Results - Policy Application
Figure A3: Estimated change in sectoral composition of gross
exports from the UK to China and India
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the sectoral decomposition of gross exports between the UK and the
US both before and after the signature of a hypothetical EIA, per Equation 6.
Figure A4: Estimated change in sectoral composition of DVA
exports from the UK to China and India
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the sectoral decomposition of DVA exports between the UK and the
US both before and after the signature of a hypothetical EIA, per Equation 6.
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Figure A5: Estimated change in sectoral composition of FVA
exports from the UK to China and India
Source: Authors’ calculations. Notes: This figure shows the sectoral decomposition of FVA exports between the UK and the
US both before and after the signature of a hypothetical EIA, per Equation 6.
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Appendix 4 Data Appendix
Appendix 4.1 Countries and sectors in 2016 World Input Output Database (WIOD)
The 2016 release of the WIOD covers 43 countries (Table A10) and is broken down into 56 industries,
per the ISIC Rev. 4 classification (Table A11). Data are avalable for years 2000-2014.












Germany Spain Russian Federation
Greece Sweden Switzerland
Hungary United Kingdom Taiwan
Ireland Turkey
Italy United States
Table A11: WIOD industry mapping to ISIC Rev. 4 sectors
WIOD ISIC Rev. 4 ISIC Rev. 4 No. WIOD
industry mapping description industries
1 A. Agriculture, forestry, and fishing 3
2 B. Mining and quarrying 1
3 C. Manufacturing 18
4 D. Electricity, gas, steam and air conditioning supply 1
5 E. Water supply; sewerage, waste management and remediation activities 2
6 F. Construction 1
7 G. Wholesale and retail trade; repair of motor vehicles and motorcycles 3
8 H. Transportation and storage 5
9 I. Accommodation and food service activities 1
10 J. Information and communication 4
11 K. Financial and insurance activities 3
12 L. Real estate activities 1
13 M. Professional, scientific and technical activities 5
14 N. Administrative and support service activities 1
15 O. Public administration and defence; compulsory social security 1
16 P. Education 1
17 Q. Human health and social work activities 1
18 R. Arts, entertainment and recreation 1
18 S. Other service activities 1
19 T. Activities of households as employers; undifferentiated goods- and services-producing activi-
ties of households for own use
1
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Appendix 4.2 DESTA variable definitions
The Design of Trade Agreement Database (DESTA), described in described in Du¨r et al. (2014), is
made publicly available by the World Trade Institute and houses detailed information on the content
of trade agreements, spanning the period 1948-2016. The types of trade arrangements (both bilateral
and multilateral) included in DESTA are: partial scope agreements; free trade agreements; customs
unions; and framework agreements. We exclude framework agreements from our analysis, as this
category is extremely shallow, does not necessarily contain any specific information on provisions
or tariff reductions, and accounts for only 1.2% of all EIAs. Descriptions of the trade agreement
provisions are in Table A12 below.
Table A12: DESTA variable definitions
Provision Criteria
Services Includes substantive provisions stipulating the liberalization
of trade in services
Investment Includes an investment chapter, such that the aim of protecting
investment relies on an existing BIT
Competition Contains a full chapter on competition (e.g. not to distort or
promote competition)
Procurement Contains concrete provisions on public procurement
IPR Includes a substantive provision on protecting IPR beyond a general
objective mentioned in the agreement’s preamble
Standards Contains at least one clause on SPS or on removing TBT
Appendix 4.3 WIOD decomposition
To decompose trade in value added indicators and gross exports we use the UIBE GVC Index 2
provided by Wang, Wei, Yu, and Zhu (2017) that follows the gross bilateral trade accounting frame-
work proposed by Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) and Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2013). In particular,
Koopman, Wang, and Wei (2014) provide a method to decompose a country’s gross exports into
value-added indicators by source and include additional double-counting terms at the aggregate level.
Wang, Wei, and Zhu (2013) further provide a methodology to decompose all bilateral intermediate
trade flows into major final demand groups according to their final destination.
This accounting framework decomposes bilateral exports per sector into 16 terms, corresponding to
four main categories and 8 subcategories. The four main categories (i.e. those presented in Figure 3)
include: domestic value added exports; domestic value-added that returns home; foreign value added
exports; and double-counted intermediate trade. At each level of disaggregation these terms sum up
to 100% of gross trade.
For our analysis, we use the 8 subcategories, and in particular we focus on the variables for DVA
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and FVA. Figure A6 depicts this decomposition of bilateral gross exports. For consistency, we keep
the same notation as in the main text, where the subscript or superscript i refers to the origin county;
j the destination country; and s and g represent different sectors. In this figure, Lii refers to the local
Leontief inverse, V to the vector of value added, Y it and Xi are the final demand between country
and total input vectors. Aij is the matrix of direct IO coefficients whose element aijsg gives units of
intermediate goods produced in sector s of country i that are used in the production of one unit of
gross output in sector g of country j. Bjt is the matrix of total IO coefficients with elements bijsg
representing the total amount of gross output in sector s in country i needed to produce an extra unit
of sector g’s final goods in country j. For a detailed derivation of the accounting framework see Wang,
Wei, and Zhu (2013).
Figure A6: Decomposition of bilateral gross exports from country i to country j
Source: UIBE GVC index system, Wang, Wei, Yu, and Zhu (2017).
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Appendix 5 Robustness Checks
Appendix 5.1 High-dimensional fixed effects with 4-year time intervals
To be consistent with international trade literature that examines the effect of EIAs on trade flows,
we re-estimate our gross and sectoral results using panel data over four-year intervals. This leaves
us with a panel covering years 2002, 2006, 2010, and 2014. As noted in the main text, this does not
eliminate much variation in our variables of interest, as the first EU enlargement we capture was in
2004. Results of this exercise for gross, DVA, and FVA are presented below for the most robust version
of our baseline specification, i.e. when including the full set of non-tariff provisions (Tables A13, A14,
and A15, respectively).21
Overall, results are similar to those presented in Section 4. In particular, the coefficient on our
variable of interest, svs& inv& com, is consistently statistically significant in all three specifications,
and the effect for trade in services (gross, DVA, and FVA) is statistically larger than for trade in
goods. As in our baseline specification, the coefficient on svs& inv& com is also positive and highly
significant for goods exports, regardless of the type of flow. We note that the magnitudes of the
coefficients on svs& inv& com are slightly larger than those in the main text in the case of goods
exports, and slightly smaller than those in the main text in the case of services exports.
Table A13: 4-year intervals - Gross exports, goods and services
Gross Goods Gross Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.244** 0.136 0.316** 0.231 0.312* 0.105
(0.109) (0.116) (0.123) (0.152) (0.163) (0.140)
svs& inv& com 0.109*** 0.114** 0.101** 0.253*** 0.231*** 0.202***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.043) (0.053) (0.057) (0.052)
proijt -0.039 -0.096 -0.014 0.098 0.061 -0.009
(0.107) (0.124) (0.119) (0.142) (0.155) (0.137)
iprijt -0.122 -0.080 -0.038 -0.416*** -0.375*** -0.413***
(0.123) (0.136) (0.125) (0.114) (0.122) (0.124)
stdijt -0.204* -0.164 -0.251* -0.021 -0.100 0.124
(0.124) (0.130) (0.138) (0.158) (0.170) (0.146)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014
R-squared 0.983 0.978 0.979 0.969 0.965 0.970
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 including the full set of EIA provisions,
with the log of gross exports as the LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
21Sectoral results have been excluded here for space reasons, but are available upon request to the authors.
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Table A14: 4-year intervals - Domestic value added, goods and services
DVA Goods DVA Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.254** 0.143 0.342*** 0.250 0.296* 0.118
(0.109) (0.111) (0.123) (0.152) (0.161) (0.140)
svs& inv& com 0.114*** 0.140*** 0.106** 0.250*** 0.240*** 0.197***
(0.039) (0.047) (0.042) (0.052) (0.056) (0.052)
proijt -0.046 -0.140 -0.000 0.112 0.126 0.004
(0.104) (0.122) (0.117) (0.141) (0.153) (0.136)
iprijt -0.102 -0.073 -0.033 -0.397*** -0.382*** -0.390***
(0.121) (0.130) (0.124) (0.109) (0.117) (0.119)
stdijt -0.224* -0.172 -0.272** -0.056 -0.133 0.090
(0.123) (0.129) (0.138) (0.158) (0.167) (0.146)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014
R-squared 0.984 0.980 0.981 0.969 0.967 0.971
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 including the full set of EIA provisions,
with the log of DVA exports as the LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
Table A15: 4-year intervals - Foreign value added, goods and services
FVA Goods FVA Services
Total Int. F inal Total Int. F inal
EIAijt 0.274** 0.154 0.282** 0.163 0.241 0.074
(0.110) (0.117) (0.126) (0.147) (0.160) (0.139)
svs& inv& com 0.106*** 0.108** 0.090** 0.214*** 0.207*** 0.179***
(0.040) (0.046) (0.045) (0.053) (0.057) (0.053)
proijt -0.071 -0.105 -0.049 0.107 0.091 -0.038
(0.112) (0.127) (0.124) (0.145) (0.159) (0.143)
iprijt -0.154 -0.126 -0.073 -0.422*** -0.414*** -0.438***
(0.130) (0.141) (0.131) (0.117) (0.121) (0.126)
stdijt -0.177 -0.158 -0.207 0.033 -0.059 0.168
(0.126) (0.134) (0.141) (0.151) (0.165) (0.146)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014 7,014
R-squared 0.981 0.978 0.977 0.968 0.965 0.969
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 including the full set of EIA provisions,
with the log of FVA exports as the LHV. Robust SEs in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical
significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
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Appendix 5.2 Poisson Pseudo-Maximum Likelihood
As a way to address the presence of zeros in our sectoral data, as well as to control for potential
heteroskedasticity in our trade data, we re-estimate the impact of EIAs on trade flows using the
Poisson pseudo maximum-likelihood (PPML) estimator, proposed by Silva and Tenreyro (2006). In
particular, we estimate the following Equations:
Xijt = exp[β1EIAijt + β2provisionijt + δit + ϕjt + γij ] + εijt (A1)
Xijst = exp[β1sEIAijt + β2sprovisionijt + δit + ϕjt + γij + σst + ψis + κjs] + εijst (A2)
over 2-year and 4-year intervals during the period 2000-2014.22 Results for aggregate trade over 4-year
intervals for Equation 3 with the full set of EIA provisions are depicted in Table A16 below.23 As
in the main body of the text, all estimations were specified with robust standard errors, and were
clustered by country-pair. While the coefficient on EIAijt is not statistically significant in most cases,
we do find a positive and significant effect of services, competition and investment provisions, with
the magnitude for services statistically larger than that for goods, supporting the main results of our
analysis.
Table A16: PPML - Gross, DVA, and FVA
Gross DVA FVA
Goods Services Goods Services Goods Services
EIAijt -0.005 -0.152 -0.116 0.225 0.278*** 0.047
(0.121) (0.151) (0.132) (0.174) (0.102) (0.231)
svs& inv& com 0.108*** 0.395*** 0.139*** 0.231*** 0.031 0.429***
(0.039) (0.074) (0.041) (0.076) (0.039) (0.106)
proijt -0.089 0.187 -0.050 0.001 -0.255*** 0.116
(0.103) (0.131) (0.112) (0.166) (0.089) (0.174)
iprijt -0.145** -0.559*** -0.119 -0.190 -0.204*** -0.860***
(0.072) (0.131) (0.076) (0.151) (0.066) (0.232)
stdijt -0.016 0.099 0.016 -0.331*** -0.077 0.133
(0.106) (0.127) (0.116) (0.114) (0.086) (0.200)
FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 7,056 7,056 7,056 7,056 7,056 7,056
R-squared 0.997 0.980 0.997 0.989 0.997 0.977
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation A1 including the full set of EIA provisions,
with total gross, DVA, and FVA exports of goods and services as LHVs. Robust standard errors, clustered
by country-pair are in parentheses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
22We use the STATA function ppml panel sg developed by Larch et al. (2017).
23Results over 2-year intervals are not included here for conciseness, nor are sectoral results over 4-year intervals. All
results are available upon request.
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Appendix 5.3 NBER-UN dataset for gross goods exports
We re-estimate Equations 3 and 4 for gross goods exports using the NBER-UN dataset described
in Feenstra et al. (2005). This dataset provides annual, 4-digit SITC Rev. 2 figures on bilateral trade
flows for 185 countries over the years 1962-2011. Based on underlying data from UN-Comtrade, gross
trade statistics in this dataset are available for merchandise trade only. Nonetheless, this source allows
us to verify our results for trade in gross goods using reported product-level trade statistics. We limit
our sample time period to years 1994 onward to account for the inclusion of modern trade agreements
only.
In order to verify the consistency of our results using this dataset, we first restrict the country
sample to that which is available in the 2016 release of the WIOD (Table A10). Subsequently, we
include the full country sample available in the NBER-UN dataset to provide external validity to
our results. To allow for comparison with the exercise carried out in Appendix 5.3, we complete this
analysis using both two-year and four-year time intervals. Results using 4-year time intervals are
presented in Table A17. Those using 2-year time intervals are extremely similar and are available
upon request. Regardless of the country sample or time-dimension at hand, we find the coefficient on
svs& inv& com to be positive and statistically significant.
Table A17: Gross goods (total), 4-year time intervals
WIOD Sample UN-NBER Sample
EIAijt 0.023 0.016 -0.002 0.037 0.023 0.064*
(0.045) (0.045) (0.071) (0.025) (0.025) (0.033)
svs& inv& com 0.102*** 0.094** 0.240*** 0.251***







FEs (it, jt, ij) Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 8,409 8,409 8,409 61,135 61,135 61,135
R-squared 0.973 0.973 0.973 0.932 0.932 0.932
Notes: This table shows the estimation results for Equation 3 including the full set of EIA provi-
sions, with the log of gross exports from the UN-NBER dataset as the LHV. Robust SEs in paren-
theses. *, **, and *** denote statistical significance at the 10, 5, and 1% levels.
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